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Via The New York Times

The image has been handed down throughout the long iconography of the West, most effectively transmitted in the image of Saint Jerome: the writer as a recluse, weaving spirited collocations of words in hushed seclusion. Jerome may have a lion at his feet, but he lacks other company — and, of course, he has no Wi-Fi. His condition is distinctly different from that of the modern writer; her room is not only well-lighted and likely lion-free, but also furnishes an Internet connection, through which the world’s tumult pours.

It has been argued that a chronic fever of distraction and fascination arrives on waves of Wi-Fi to stunt our attention spans, encouraging writers to paddle about, tweeting and liking, instead of striking out for deeper waters. As a writer who writes about writers, I struggle with this surfeit of ideas and impressions myself, but I also can see this so-called malady from a different point of view, through the prism of history. Authors, after all, have always sought the means to build bridges between the world and the page. Wi-Fi, Google Docs, social networks and even smartphones and other gadgets are just the most recent means of doing so. While they can distract us with their bells and whistles, they also provide powerful tools for gathering information, tracking renegade thoughts and inspirations and disciplining the flow of words and ideas.

The impulse to connect to the outside world is an ancient one. Martial, the wry and ribald Roman poet, relished bringing the prosaic textures of daily experience into his poems — and to bring the moment of their making into the world. Martial, in his epigrams, often caught himself composing in media res — as in Epigram 4.10, in which he sends a slave to deliver a gift of poems so newly composed, their ink is still wet.

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Curated by Phineas Upham

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By Phineas Upham

Defining and Developing Competence: A Strategic Process Paradigm by McGrath, MacMillan, and Venkataraman attempts to provide a more rigorous level of methodological testability and explication to the antecedents and nature of competence. To do this the authors decompose and analyze some antecedents to competence in 160 new initiatives in 40 organizations from 16 counties. Based on their reading of the literature, they test for comprehension of the problem/issues, deftness or how smoothly (without excess communication or wasted effort) the team works together and finally emerging competence or the teams’ ability to meet goals and expectations. The authors emphasize that they are attempting to do a study which will be a standard upon which other literature can build. They seem to believe that strategic work on competence has been lacking in the carefulness, explication, and simplicity which they work hard to achieve. They take special care to say that their study is reproducible and based on previous literature.

This essay raises the question: How should strategic research be approached? What methodologies should be used to study it? How much testability is necessary? And what methodological approach will result in the most long-term gains in understanding? McGrath, MacMillan and Venkataraman seem to believe that the best (or perhaps a very good) approach is one which is significantly more hypothesis driven and testable than most research in strategy at their time. In order to address this belief, they take the unit of analysis down to the project and develop measures and questionnaires to put to the team members. They also ask the respondents to measure the team I terms of “competence” or fulfilling objectives under financial and temporal constraints.

There are numerous potential problems with approaching strategic issues from this methodological perspective, and also some real advantages. On the plus side, such an approach leads to results that are disprovable, explicit, and usually relatively clear. The body of literature that would result from such projects could be mutually supportable, mutually reinforcing, and, potentially, could build on each other to reach some well established truths about the makeup, antecedents, and nature of sound strategic behavior. The approach the authors advocate seems to me to be very much like the approach currently favored in organizational behavior and, indeed, the authors seem to use the same scope, methodologies, and precautions that a good OB researcher would use.

On the other hand, I can foresee numerous disadvantages to such a methodology, especially such a methodology used as the dominant one in strategic research. Firstly, such a pursuit will tend to discover components, elements and antecedents to capabilities, strategic advantage, and such concepts. It will tend to atomize research and split it into highly specialized camps studying very specific phenomena closely, making very general theorizing difficult. But one of the most interesting and innovative areas of strategy is the general theoretical and conceptual frameworks for thinking about strategy that have arisen in such authors as Prahalad, Doz, Porter, Winter, and Hamel. Many of these insights could not be quantified or tested in any easily conceivable way. Despite the authors claim early in the article, testing such atomistic phenomena would tend to deemphasize the firm-level and industry level sort of approaches that can result in very interesting and fruitful insight.

Secondly, such an approach has, I would argue, a knowledge accumulation curve associated with it which is seductive and in some ways dangerous. By studying groups and the antecedents to competence, I argue that a high learning curve will be initially reached. Some core truths will emerge from this methodology that will excite researchers and make significant leaps in understanding. But as these truths are discovered a reduction of the rate of learning follows. Many concepts in strategy are not suitable to this sort of analysis since they are very complex, dynamic, and multidimensional (perhaps even resulting from different characteristics in different times and places).

Thirdly, strategy is a phenomenon that lives in a very rich and multi-faceted context. Firms compete against each and groups compete against each other. It is very hard to capture or measure such complexity. Perhaps the best way to approach such complexity is to look at results rather than processes.

Fourthly, there is an implicit assumption in the essay that this sort of analysis, applied here to groups, can be eventually broadened to generate insights in firm level analysis. I do not think this will be as easy or as fruitful as it appears. The very nature of competence is such that no individual member may be aware of the nature of the competence or where it resides. Thus, I believe such an approach, for all its promise, has a circumscribed area of fruitfulness.
In conclusion, this paper is good demonstration of what the authors believe is an important new methodology in strategy research. It advocates this methodology and attempts, through an empirical study of the antecedents of group level competence to demonstrate its value. I have discussed the advantages and promises of such an approach, which are many, and I have hypothesized about some potential disadvantages if the mainstream of the strategy field were to get caught up in this approach. Thus, while I think researchers should pursue this approach, and valuable results will be derived from it, I believe that mainstream strategic research would be benefited in maintaining its eclectic, sometimes undisciplined, and meandering ways.

About the Author

Phineas Upham is a frequent contributor to the Editorial Reader, writing on subjects as diverse as economics and philosophy. His writing examines the intersections of complex social institutions, and how they relate to productivity and innovation. For more information, visit his website at Phineas-Upham.com.

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From contributor Phineas Upham

Why is this economic slowdown happening? Arguably, excluding questionable heuristic adjustments, the growth path of the US excluding real estate has been slowing down since 1980 in real GDP terms. This is despite the illusory gains in asset valuations which partly resulted from reduced volatility (thus reduced discount rates), the bubbles which gave people hope for productivity gains, and the leverage which inflated the problem. This is very different than after the great depression – in 1943 we grew at perhaps fastest rate for any advanced nation in history.

When being good investors we often examine the situation of the world by drawing on what we see as similar situations in history. On this way we tease out the larger brush strokes of history. Indeed Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has drawn heavily on his knowledge of the Great Depression to guide the US through this crisis – implying that there is an analogy between that situation and this one and that

A broader question is: how we might use history to understand the present. Three quotes help frame different approaches:

a) “Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it”
b) “Those who live in the past can never move forward”
Or perhaps something between these two…
c) “History doesn’t repeat itself but it rhymes”

One thing that seems certain when comparing the current to the last is that while good analogies are enormously helpful, one must choose the right ones and understand the differences. Good analogies are key but they have their limitations.

So what historical situation is this crisis “like” – what’s the most useful analogy?

1) 1999 technology bubble. One could argue that this bubble burst but at least it left a legacy of progress in telecommunications and the internet which, while below expectations, has continued.

2) Oil Crisis that led to 1982 crisis? In this case, high oil prices and government mismanagement led to unhealthy nominal inflation rates – Volker correctly responded to rampant inflation with austere financial policy and the US emerged into a period of enormous productivity.

2) Is US like Japan in the 1980s? Japan was able to turn itself into an exporter to the US and keep a high savings rate.

3) The Great Depression? Perhaps but it seems that the proper analogy for the US in the great depression is perhaps China now – an exporter with strong industry who is beginning to flex global muscles.

Two books have invigorated a debate in political science over the extent to which history is relevant in global analysis. The first is Francis Fukuyama’s The End the History and the Last Man and the second is Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations.

To overly simplify the arguments, the first argues that the political development of the world was over because democracy was soon to be the global rule and that democracies are stable and don’t evolve (in the sense of feudalism – monarchy – capitalism/democracy, sort of a socialist dialectic the socialists thought led eventually to communism). So the world will soon reach a democratic equilibrium.

The second argues that a global struggle for power was emerging for the first time due to globalization. Islam, Asia, and the West were in a life and death struggle for supremacy and the outcome was in doubt. Both argue that a paradigm shift has occurred in global history unlike the past – that analogies are rather pointless. Which is right? Are we in a new age of history, is it “different this time”? It is important to know.

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From contributor Phineas Upham

The word evolution has changed its meaning over the past century with the introduction of Darwinian theories. Despite this shift in usage, many of the connotations and shades of meaning of older usages have carried over to today. The word evolution is sometimes used today as a crude amalgamation of two usages of the word and is thus often misused. In The Anthropology Journal Herbert Spenson uses one of the word evolution’s contemporary meaning. He mistake of assuming that Darwinianesk evolution is a forward, upward moving force is typical of the common misuse of the word.

Keywords, by Raymond Williams, analyzes the history of the changes in usage of the word evolution. Evolution, Williams explains, is derived for the French word évolution, which is derived from the Latin evolutionem. This Latin root word means unrolling a book (the Romans used scrolls as books). This rather limited definition was soon broadened to mean the revealing of an unknown but already complete plan. In 1762, the word became popularized by Bonnet in his theory of evolution. Evolution came to mean the development “from [A] rudamentry to mature [state]” (Williams, 120). This transition connoted a move from a lower to a higher level of development. When Darwin formally introduced his theory of evolution in The Origin of Species in 1854, he used the word in a different way. Evolution for Darwin was not progress but adaptation. Thus an animal evolved to better suit its circumstances, its new state was not inherently better. In fact, two animals in different circumstances can evolve in opposite directions without contradiction. The definition of evolution thus had competing meanings.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines Evolution in many different ways. The first definition given is “The prosses of unfolding, opening out, or disengaging from an envelope.” I have never run across the word evolution used in this way, and this is certainly not a dominant meaning. One must go to definition number six before the standard usage is introduced. The dictionary clearly separates the different uses of evolution and delineates their appropriate use. In common language these distinctions are not always respected.

Herbert Spenson wrote an article in The Anthropology Journal which uses evolution in a way which mixes the preDarwinian and Darwinian aspects of the word. “The opposable thumb evolved, through natural selection, as a superior tool for the advancement of the species.” His reference to natural selection gives evolution a distinctly Darwinian flavor, and yet his ideas of ”advancement” and “superior” also brings in the idea of evolution as a progression form a lower state to a higher one. He is thus mixing different definitions.

The word evolution has gone through many changes in definition. The OED seems to incorrectly order its definitions in terms of contemporary importance but includes all the historical usages of the word. The one of the common contemporary usages of the word evolution is a combination of the two latest meanings of the word, that of Bonnet and that of Darwin. Words change meaning gradually, often with each new use overlapping the old uses. Thus, as in the case of the word evolution, words often have more than one meaning at a time.

About the Author
Phineas Upham has an extensive educational background in philosophy and economics. He contributes editorials on philosophy, culture, and more. For more from Phineas Upham, visit his website at PhineasUpham.com.

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By Phineas Upham

The relationship between faith and knowledge in Christianity is troublesome. Some Christian authors deny that knowledge leads to faith, St. Augustine for example felt that his worldly knowledge was a hindrance to his conversion. Other Christian authors, such as John Donne, believe knowledge and reason is a necessary prerequisite for faith. Kierkegaard sees the realm of human knowledge and the realm of the divine to be of a different sphere and under different criteria. Revealed by an exploration of this relationship is the paradoxical and many-faceted nature of Christianity. Yet all the authors remain under the same umbrella, albeit a large one. In the plesitude of voices on this issue, with none rising very far above the rest, the flexibility, the ambiguity, the diversity, and the strength of Christianity are illuminated. Disturbing questions remain: Are the wise closer to God? What is the difference between worldly knowledge, scriptural knowledge, and divine knowledge? What does a Christian need to know in order to believe? Why does the word knowledge have a silent k?

A more appropriate question then the penultimate one above is what sort of knowledge, if any, does a Christian need to have in order to believe. Most of the authors recognize three distinct types of knowledge: scriptural knowledge, worldly knowledge, and divine knowledge. St. Gregory of Nyssa agreed with St. Augustine’s view that the divine nature of God (divine knowledge) is inscrutability when Nyssa wrote that, “[Christs] incorruptible nature is beyond verbal interpretation. ” “Words strain,/Crack and sometimes break, under the burden/under the tension ” agreed Eliot. Aelred agreed that knowledge of God was impossible and counseled man to study man instead. In order to describe the inherently indescribable the authors often resort contradictions. “You must go through the way in which you are not./ And what you do not know is the one thing you know/ … And where you are is where you are not. ” “You are unchangeable and yet you change all things. You are old, and yet all things have new life from you. … You are active, yet always at rest. ” Christianity is what Kierkegaard calls a paradox-religion. Knowledge alone is not enough. A leap of faith, an epiphany, a conversion is necessary. Man cannot earn faith, in the end he must be given it. The paradoxical nature of faith rests firmly on this problem. How can a Christian have faith if the proof is, on principle, unavailable? How can a rational person believe without proof? It is clear that the authors do not claim to offer proof. “How can an Apostle prove that he has authority? If he could prove it physically then he would not be an Apostle. He has no other proof than his own statement. That has to be so. ” “The Church demanded that certain things should be believed even though they could not be proved. ” A Christian therefor does not, and must not, require divine knowledge for faith. Though the authors read tend to agree that the final step toward faith must be a leap, they conflict over what sort of knowledge leads toward faith and over what the proper relationship between faith and knowledge is.

St. Augustine tackles the relationship between faith and knowledge in his Confessions. Although Augustine explicitly rejects worldly knowledge, the book as a whole leaves the reader more ambiguous on the role of knowledge in faith. Augustine does not feel his actions entitled him to receive God’s grace. “I shall look to you, Lord, by praying to you… it is my faith that calls to you, Lord, the faith which you gave me… you are not drawn down to us but draw us up to yourself. ” Rather it is God’s through God’s mercy and despite out great sins that we receive grace. In Augustine’s youth he valued honor and praise and rhetorical ability. “I stood in peril as a boy. I was already being prepared for [the worlds] tournaments by training… I was blind to the whirlpool of debasement in which I had been plunged away from the sight of your eyes… My sin was this, that I looked for pleasure, beauty, and truth not in him but in myself and his other creatures, and the search led me instead to pain, confusion, and error. ” But his search for knowledge of the truth began in earnest after reading Cicero’s Hortensius. “[upon reading the Hortensius] All the empty dreams suddenly lost their charm and my heart began to throb with a bewildering passion for wisdom of eternal truth. I began to climb out of the depths to which I had sunk in order to return to you. ” So it seems that knowledge both led Augustine astray and helped him find himself. Christianity has always been a word based, a logo-centric, religion. The scriptures are for Augustine a necessary but insufficient element to faith. By studying Augustine’s path from knowledge to faith we can isolate what was, for him, the relationship between the two.

But Augustine did not find his faith through knowledge. “The dishes they set before me were still loaded with dazzling fantasies, illusions with which the eye deceives the mind… it did not nourish me but starved me all the more. ” His relentless search for truth in material knowledge led him astray. “I deafened the ears of my heart by allowing my mind to twist and turn among these material inventions. ” Augustine laments his intelligence and knowledge as temptations which he fell for. “What then was the value to me of my intelligence [and knowledge] when in the doctrine of your love I was lost… And was it so great a drawback to your faithful children that they were slower than I to understand such things? For they did not forsake you. ” But Augustine’s intelligence played more of a role in his belief than he sometimes claims. Though he says, “I ought to have deplored my state, but instead my knowledge only bred self-conceit. ” His reading of the Hortensius drew his from the worldly toward truth, and the Platonists led his to look for truth “as something incorporeal, and I caught sight of your invisible nature. ” So perhaps, worldly knowledge can correct itself. It led Augustine from the correct path, and then turned him in the right direction.
It was scriptural knowledge that Augustine credits with leading him to the doorstep of faith. Though it could not take him beyond that. “The words of the scriptures were planted firmly in my heart and on all sides you were there like a rampart to defend me. ” The words of the scripture, and belief in his heart were not enough. Augustine says, “I was in torment, reproaching myself more bitterly than ever as I twisted and turned on my chain. I hoped that my chain might be broken once and for all, because it was only a small thing that held me. All the same it held me. ” He uses the passive tense when describing the severing of the chain because it was not through will or knowledge, or even belief that his faith would finally come. It was through the grace of God. Fallen, sinful man can never earn faith.

After all, if faith were earned, how could it be lost? Why so much doubt. Why is doubt so essential to the nature of paradox-religion? It seems that if faith were earned then doubt would imply that some of the knowledge or some of the acts which earned the faith had disappeared. But this is not how doubt is created for the authors we read. And belief is not restored by new facts, or new acts, but instead through grace and a releasing of self. Augustine explains how the will to convert cannot be sufficient. He was told to “take it and read” and after he did “it was as though the light of confidence flooded my heart and all the darkness of doubt was dispelled. ” Augustine had studied Paul in depth before, but the passage did not change him when first read. It was therefor not the content itself that had such power. Augustine’s worldly knowledge served only to untangle itself. It was his scriptural knowledge that led him to belief, since “we are too weak to discover truth by reason alone and for this reason need the authority of sacred books. ” But though Augustine speaks of “men who have not had our schooling, yet they stand up and storm the gates of heaven while we, for all our learning, lie here groveling in this world of flesh and blood! ” It is clear that knowledge played a large part of both his road to sin and his road to faith. Could he have analyzed and understood the scriptures, much less read them, if he had not studied worldly knowledge? Was not his final conversion, by Augustine’s own logic, more wonderful because he had sinned? Did he not owe much to Cicero and the Platonists? Though Augustine may envy the simple who were inculcated in faith, he seems aware of his own great status as a great man of God a title he earned due to his knowledge and intelligence. It is unclear to me that a man of Augustine’s intelligence would have been as content in his faith if he had not already suffered all the temptations of earthly knowledge. He himself admits he might have been tempted from the faith by Cicero if he had not already read him. Lastly, what status does the Confessions themselves have? They are not scripture, yet they are intended to help those who are lost find the light. They are loaded with rhetorical devices, and clever crafting, tools Augustine learned while in sin, and are not scripture in the proper sense. If they therefor count as worldly knowledge, and they are intended to help people find Christianity, they seem in conflict with the message they contain (that worldly knowledge misleads and “you alone are the life which never dies and the wisdom that needs no light besides itself. ”). Perhaps this can be resolved by concluding that worldly knowledge cannot lead man toward God, but it can, as it did with Augustine, untangle its own knots.

John Donne, who lived in 17th century England during the times of Humanism, believes that the light of reason was a necessary part of our finding God. Augustine would have argued against man’s prominent place in reaching God. Donne writes that “the common light of reason illuminates us all; but one imployes this light upon the searching of impertinent vanities, another by a better use of the same light, finds out the Mysteries of Religion. ” So though reason can be used or abused, if used correctly “by the benefit of this light, men see through the darest, and the most impervious places that are… All the wayes, both of Wisdome and of craft lie open to this light, this light of natural reason. ” But while Donne makes the link between faith ad reason a much closer one than Augustine, nevertheless he grants that it is insufficient to reaching faith. “Knowledge cannot save us, but we cannot be saved without Knowledge; Faith is not on this sade of knowledge, but beyond it; we must necessarily come to Knowledge first, though we must not stay at it, when we are to come thither. ” If all Donne meant by Knowledge was scriptural knowledge, he and St. Augustine would agree. But Donne has a wider understanding of knowledge and reason. “Some men by the benefit of this light of Reason, have found out things profitable and useful to the whole world; as in particular, Printing. ” Martin Luther would agree with the value of the printing press and the translation into the vernacular. Donne sees worldly knowledge as a more positive thing than Augustine. He believes it can bring man loser to God. Though it is not a sufficient condition, it is a necessary one. But if this is true, does this imply that a man with more reason can blow his ember of divine knowledge into a larger flame? Can the more intelligent really reach closer to God? Augustine would answer a resounding “No.”

Soren Kierkegaard draws a sharp line between the worldly sphere and the divine sphere. A genius and an apostle may say the identical words, but the content and the meaning of their messages are very different. The core of the difference lies in authority. Central to Christianity is its paradoxical nature. It need not make sense, and it need not prove its correctness. Thus we need no knowledge in the traditional sense in order to have faith. We do not need arguments, or facts, or even reasons. “Genius is appreciated purely aesthetically according to the measure of its content, and its specific weight; an apostle is who he is through having divine authority… It is not by evaluating the content of the doctrine aesthetically or intellectually that I should or could reach the result… I have not got to listen to St. Paul because he has divine authority. ” To base your belief on facts, intellectual or aesthetic, would thus be the basest form of blasphemy. “To ask whether a king is a genius – with the intent, if such were the case, of obeying him, is in reality lese-majeste; for the question conceals a doubt whether one intends to submit to authority. ” Surely God, who is the king of kings, and has eternal power, not just temporal power, Kierkegaard reasons, should not be asked for reasons. “To ask whether Christ is profound is blasphemy, and is an attempt (whether conscious or not) to destroy Him surreptitiously; for the question conceals a doubt concerning His authority, and his attempt to weigh him up is impertinent in its directness. ” Indeed, though a sentence has the same words, it means something different if it came from a genius or an apostle. If a man discovered the identical message of an apostle and said it, Kierkegaard argues, it would not be the same. We evaluate the worlds of the poet and the king differently even if they are identical. One has authority one does not. In fact, he argues, if Christ answered the question “Is there eternal life?” by “there is eternal life. ” this would be a statement of fact, and not profound at all. Whereas if Plato were to say the same thing, his statement would be enormously profound, since he has no authority. Similarly, if Plato were to say it, we would expect and demands proofs, whereas if Christ said it a person of faith would need neither. But this division between knowledge and faith, though it is convincing, does not answer the question of how one acquires faith. How can a rational man believe if there can be no proof. For “how can an Apostle prove that he has authority? If he could prove it physically then he would not be an Apostle. He has no other proof than his own statement. That has to be so; for otherwise the believers relationship to him would be direct instead of being paradoxical. ” More vexing than how a rational man can believe, within the framework of Kierkegaard’s logic, is how a rational man begins to believe. It cannot be through proof. It is not through God’s brute physical power (as it is with a king). The answer in this line of argument lies within the paradox of God’s authority. It cannot be answered, it transcends the rational.

The scholars here acknowledge that the final leap of faith to faith is not through knowledge alone. But they disagree on the appropriate relationship between faith and knowledge. They place at least some importance on scriptural knowledge (though Kierkegaard would not call it knowledge). The authors generally agree that divine knowledge is impossible. But on the subject of worldly knowledge, there is fierce disagreement. Augustine believes it misleads, Donne thinks it is a necessary but insufficient possession, and Kierkegaard, perhaps most convincingly, dismisses it as not pertinent to paradox-religion. Aelred believe that man should understand and love his fellow man to reach God, while Kierkegaard believed that mankind should be scorned. Bonhoffer believed that a Christian sometimes ought to interfere with politics of the world and gave his life to that end, while St. Francis believed in generally accepting the world as it was and contemplating God alone. Ultimately no clear answer emerges as to the proper relationship between faith and knowledge. Yet though the authors all disagree how they got there, all of them have faith. All remain Christians despite their differences. Perhaps there is no correct relationship, and each person, as each author did, must find their own path. Perhaps while attempting to understand this conundrum we ought to remember: “Vanity, vanity, all is vanity. And that which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is lacking cannot be counted. ”

About the Author
While an undergraduate student at Harvard University, Phineas Upham was the Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Review of Philosophy. He graduated from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and currently works as an investor in New York City and San Francisco. Visit his website at PhineasUpham.com.

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By Phineas Upham

Research suggests that after the age of 25 (to the age of 75) wisdom does not seem to increase with age (Baltes). Further, our ability to remember facts and recall them seems to quickly declined sharply over those years. IQ may indeed by stable over a lifetime because knowledge increased as speed of recall decreased – thus leaving a well balanced IQ test largely stable over time. Must it not be true, then for the Wisdom test, in which memory is a factor, if it decreases, that some other aspect of wisdom increases? Perhaps there is some deeper value to this other aspect of wisdom, i.e. something that we can learn from this increasing old-age associated aspect of wisdom (a balance, a patience, a perspective) in a way that we cannot learn from younger wise men (who have the quality of quick memories, which is of limited usefulness, perhaps). Perhaps, though wisdom remains invariant to age, there are types of wisdom (which are not differentiated in the meta-term “wisdom”) that we value more and types we value less. Or rather, types we learn from more, and types we learn from less. Or perhaps different problems necessitate different types of wisdom. It seems disturbing to think that one’s wisdom does not increase much with age (which is one interpretation of the data as presented, though the data is insufficient to do more than suggest this).
What makes a life good? The researcher Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi – M.C. – (“Flow”) linked a dedicated life to a happy, meaningful one. I would prefer a more substantive definition of a life with meaning. Misplaced meaning (being dedicated to a bad cause) seems insufficient for any kind of full life except from a purely structural perspective.
Aristotle and “the Examined Life” both discussed the idea of Wisdom. In Aristotle, a differentiation between practical wisdom and non-practical, theoretical wisdom was proposed. In the examined life an understanding of wisdom as a deeper perspective of the world (though a synthesis with the Value and Meaning Chapter and the Importance and Weight chapter, one might doubt whether one objective deepest understanding is possible.). Wisdom is seem as one of life’s outcomes. Similarly, it is seem as one of the most important attributes that people can have. The question becomes, can you seek it? Can you maximize the amount of it you can get? In the Examined Life, the answer is yes. This is what philosophers, to an extent, attempt to do. The value of wisdom is deeply related to ones understanding of reality. I would emphasize that it is a very personal understanding that is finely tuned to what experiences one has had and what paths one has pursued. Thus one’s life can be seen mapped onto reality through what wisdom one has (those parts of reality (i.e. what wisdom you have)) is the part that develop on the “photo-paper” of truth, those other areas in which one is ignorant are never exposed. Thus an incomplete, but meaningful final picture results that is intimately connected to the shape of your life. Like a negative and a photograph, it is a matter of what light has been exposed. In this way individuality can be maintained in the face of objective standards and absolute truth.

To read more articles from Phineas Upham, visit his website at PhineasUpham.com

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From contributing author Phineas Upham

As debate about Afghanistan and Iraq rages in the US, and Radio Free America tries to spread free market ideas and encourage democracy in the former USSR and Middle East, it is often left out that experience is the best teacher. We should be welcoming the best youths of the world to visit and spend time in America. The Arab Spring, perhaps the most successful movement for (so far) positive change of the last decade, was built by youth who demanded more. In 1959 at the height of the cold war Nixon and Khrushchev passed by a working model of the average kitchen in America – and it blew the Soviet leader away, putting him immediately on the defensive.

Seeing and experiencing America – on TV and especially in person – shows others the great wealth and freedom most US citizens enjoy. Rather than restricting travel of others to America on vacation and schooling, or making it very difficult to get short term work visas, we should be using it as a key foreign policy – encouraging the next generation of influencers to spend time here and return home to improve their nations, to “go and do likewise.”

We should identify and encourage young people from abroad who are likely to be influential as media workers or political and academic leaders to spend time studying in the United States. These students, primarily from troubled countries with uneasy relations with the Unites States, would return to work in their homelands and, in speaking of their U.S. experiences, help dispel myths. Candidates from Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Saudi Arabia, for example.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Peace Corps, it has in many ways proven to be an appealing and powerful organization to US youth and shaped many lives for the better. A similar program might be implemented to mobilize a small U.S. civil service corps of volunteer college graduates could work off their government college loans for two years in foreign service. These volunteers could expand their horizons and work on a worthy cause when they are both reasonably mature and largely unencumbered by family or career considerations. They would identify promising and open-minded young students in selected countries, particularly those interested in careers in journalism, government and the academy, and help them apply for exchange programs, admission and scholarships to U.S. schools. People should be encouraged to host students and young activists who want to visit the US for a time.

The premise of this program is that ignorance of the United States is partly responsible for anti-democratic attitudes abroad. People who have never lived here cannot effectively screen out caricatures and lies presented by their closest sources of information – biased local and regional media, politicians playing to the worst in people, academics who may not know any better. Offering future opinion shapers direct experience of the United States might go a long way in providing a framework for more discerning and open minds in the next generation of people who create the climate of opinion of other nations.

Education is one of our greatest exports, and in doing foreign service and offering opportunities for a U.S. education, these volunteers would present the young and vibrant face of the United States to the people of these other nations. In gaining familiarity with the cultures of the countries they visit, those U.S. volunteers would also bring experienced voices to cultural and political discussions back home and become more involved with national service throughout their lives. This program would thus benefit our own young while improving relations with others.

Phineas Upham is a regular contributor to the Editorial Reader, and the curator of our Philosophy section.

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By contributing author Phineas Upham

Many people embraced freedom of thought, and freedom of constraints as a unilateral means of achieving creativity. “To raise new questions, new possibilities, regard old problems from new angles, requires imagination… meaning, respectable meaning was identified was identified with the logical thinking of humankind, while human imaginative thought was identified with the animalistic, the irrational, the illogical, the instinctual, the repressive, and ultimately the dangerous.” (“Creative Cognition” Ward. Smith, Finke p217). But it is forgotten that many creative innovations are made in highly structured and goal oriented situations. It is the few geniuses such as Freud and Darwin and Einstein that are lionized that are such iconoclasts. But it is often unrecognized that the majority of creative thinking exists in everyday business life, in science, in everyday R & D, and in order to create novels for mainstream publication or broad domain acceptance.

How does the studying of creativity matter? Is it a purely intellectual exercise or can knowledge gained serve to be useful? In “Implications of a Systems Perspective for the study of Creativity” Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi lists structural characteristics of the society, the domain and the family that would encourage creativity. But he leaves open the question whether we can manipulate the system such that it incorporates more of there characteristics. Surely a conscious decision to store information in a better, more accessible way could be arranged thus making the Culture more receptive to change.

But it is not clear what, other than providing the conditions for creativity a conscious, powerful ruling body could do to influence the creativity of a society. Could the Soviet System not direct the efforts of its scientists such that the soviet system was a first world military power (including the innovations and inventions that allowed them to get into space first) while remaining a third world power in other ways.

Surely, the US could encourage physicists in WWII to develop the bomb and scientists in the 1950’s to develop a rocket to the moon.

But though these examples, however limited, show that a government can influence creativity which already exists (i.e. channel it), it is not clear: 1) if this channeling has negative effects in other fields, that is it inappropriately allocates creative resources to a field to which they are not best suited or 2) if such a body can effectively encourage or enlarge the amount of creativity in the society on aggregate.

If the study of creativity can allow us to help structure society such that creativity is maximized, that would be a valuable reason to study creativity. More persuasive, certainly, than Sternberg and Lubart’s unpersuasive introduction to “the concept of creativity” which bemoans the lack of research on creativity based on the assertion that it is an important body of knowledge.

Certainly the US government hopes to encourage arts through the NEA, an attempt to encourage creativity. The common view is that the government steps in to prevent such performers from either disappearing or from being “tainted” by corporate influences or from having to pander to popular culture at the expense of “art.” It is interesting to note that popular culture and business is seem as in some ways antithetical to creativity. Yet, in a free market, with complex incentives, seems the best vehicle for the encouragement of creativity ever invented, companies are extremely interested in creativity in certain directions. Many of the most creative technical inventions have been produced in such R & D laboratories as Bell Labs. Yet, somehow, the goal directed nature of such companies seems to be an inhibition to “pure” research and “pure” creativity. Similarly, popular culture seems to encourage movies and music which simply re-mixes past successes. It is assumed that the real breakthroughs come from the alternative worlds of film and music where a specialized crowd can appreciate the creativity of the performer.

Such a dichotomy between business and the mainstream vs. co-called ”true” creativity is troubling. On one level, it seems justified, on another it begs the question whether government encouraged creativity is any less tainted and any less warped. Perhaps only the conditions for creativity ought to be encouraged in society and such micro efforts to increase creativity are largely futile.

If the value of truly “pure creativity” is to enrich lives (verses the monetary interest of business and the goal of immediate pleasure that seems to be the ruling motivation of popular culture) then it is hard to imagine a system that can judge and encourage this end without being itself a warping influence with biases and motivations that are served. Perhaps an Einstein and a Darwin must have some individual drive to make a difference to humanity and find the truth that will foil any effort to increase it directly. Perhaps all society can do is set up conditions that will do as little as possible to foil such people and then step aside and hope. The diversity and creativity of humanity is then likely to step forward with a few shinning beacons.

Because the creativity of others can enrich ones life both through art, the understanding of new truth, and through invention that change ones life. Similarly, the individual being creative gets some satisfaction through conceiving of and sharing with others his ideas and gifts. Change is not necessarily progress. Nevertheless, without creativity there could be no real individuality and life would be quite dull.

For more writing from Phineas Upham, visit his website at PhineasUpham.com

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